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Abstract: The article uses the case of Japan to argue that the theory of open
access order advocated by North and his colleagues goes beyond what is
necessary. Although their theory of open access order explains the West rela-
tively well, it does not always apply to contemporary non-Western countries.
Similar to the case of India examined elsewhere, the case of Japan reveals that
what is more important to economic and human development is the open access
in the economic sphere and the interconnected institutions in the areas of
property rights protection and contract enforcement, financial market, rule of
law, and human resource accumulation. In other words, countries without open
access in the political sphere may also be able to achieve a great deal of success
in terms of economic and human development if they ensure open access in the
economic sphere and devote adequate resources to establishing the necessary
interconnected institutions examined in this article. Further research elsewhere
on Singapore and China will shed more light on this debate.
Keywords: open access order, interconnected institutions, competitive
democracy, Japan
1 Introduction
Japan experienced very high rates of economic growth after the Meiji Restoration
(1868–1911).1 The country turned itself from a feudal and agricultural society
under the rule of Tokugawa to a modern industrialized nation after World War II
(WWII). The outcome of development is reflected in the following statistics. The
real GDP growth rate was 2.65 per cent from 1890 to 1905, 3.18 to 3.49 per cent
from 1905 to 1935, 9.38 per cent from 1946 to 1960, 8.26 per cent from 1960 to
1975.2 While the economic growth rate was reduced after 1975, Japan still
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1 William G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
2 Takatoshi Ito, Japan and the Asian Economies: A `Miracle’ in Transition, 2 Brookings Paper on
Economic Activity (1996), 205–272, at 209.
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maintained a GDP growth rate of 4.12 per cent from 1975 to 1990.3 It was only
after 1990 that economic growth started to stagnate.4 The living standard of the
Japanese people reached that of the Southern European nations following World
War I (WWI).5 While the per capita GDP growth rate of 3 per cent from 1890 to
1990 was 60 per cent higher than that of the United States, it was really from
1955 to 1975 that the per capita GDP increased about four times to that of the
United States.6 In 1988, the per capita GNP in Japan was 6.4 per cent higher than
that of the United States.7 In 1990, Japan ranked as being the world’s most
competitive economy.8 The high rate of economic development in Japan has
been closely related to human development indicators. The attendance rate of
elementary school increased from 28 per cent in 1872 to 98 per cent in 1910.9 The
proportion of students completing high school increased from 51 per cent in 1955
to 91 per cent in 1975, 94 per cent in 1990, and 97 per cent in 2003.10 The infant
mortality rate declined from the very high rate of 76.7 per thousand immediately
after WWII in 194711 to 40 in 1950 and 20 in 1965.12 Since then, the rate steadily
decreased to 7.5 per thousand in 1980, 4.6 in 1990 and 3.2 in 2000.13 With
respect to the life expectancy rate, it also increased from a relatively lower rate
of 50.06 for males and 53.96 for females in 1947 to 67.74 for males and 72.92 for
females in 1965, 74.78 for males and 80.48 for females in 1980 and 78.32 for
males and 85.23 for females in 2002.14
3 Id., p. 209.
4 The real GDP growth rate was 1.28 per cent from 1990 to 1995, ibid. See also, Takeo Hoshi and
Anil K. Kashyap, Japan’s Financial Crises and Economic Stagnation, 18 The Journal of Economic
Perspective, no. 1 (2004), 3–26, at 3–4.
5 Martin Bronfenbrenner, Some Lessons of Japan’s Economic Development, 1853–1938, 34 Pacific
Affairs, no. 1 (1961), 7–27, at 20.
6 Yoshihisa Godo and Yujiro Hayami, Catching Up in Education in the Economic Catch-up of
Japan with the United States, 1890–1990, 50 Economic Development and Cultural Change, no. 4,
(2002), 961–978, at 968.
7 William T. Ziemba and Sandra L. Schwartz, The Growth in the Japanese Stock Market, 1949–90
and Prospects for the Future, 12 Managerial and Decision Economics, no. 2 (1991), 183–195, at 191.
8 Ethan Scheiner, Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One Party
Dominant State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 32–33.
9 Harold W. Stevenson, Japanese Elementary School Education, 92 The Elementary School
Journal, no. 1 (1991), 109–120, at 110.
10 Yasumasa Kuroda, The Core of Japanese Democracy: Latent Interparty Politics (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 174.
11 Ibid.
12 See Japan: Infant Morality Rate, available at: < https://knoema.com/atlas/Japan/topics/
Demographics/Mortality/Infant-mortality-rate > , accessed 10 January 2017.
13 Kuroda (2005), supra note 10, p. 174.
14 Id., p. 174.
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People may argue that the case of Japan is consistent with the proposition
by North and his colleagues15 that Japan’s development after the Meiji
Restoration followed the Western model in the sense of achieving open access
in the economic sphere followed by the political sphere starting from the Meiji
period with limited suffrage and achieving universal suffrage after WWII.
North and his colleagues divide countries or regions into natural states and
open access orders.16 Natural states solve the problem of violence by limiting
access to political organizations and activities and to economic organizations
and activities, to elite coalition groups. In this way, natural states maintain
stability and make wide social interaction possible. As natural states have to
use greater rents or privileges to please the dominant coalition, it is less likely
for these countries or regions to have a vibrant and dynamic economy, com-
pared with countries or regions with open access orders.
The open access order advocated by North and his colleagues17 requires that a
country has open access to political organizations and activities, and, open access
to economic organizations and activities. An open access in the political sphere
makes it difficult for the government or any faction to manipulate the open access
order in the economy. Similarly, open access to economic organizations and
activities requires political organizations to consider the broad interest of society
in order to gain political power to run a government. Historically, open access to
political organizations and activities and open access to economic organizations
and activities interacted to mutually reinforce each other in the West. United
Kingdom and France are two examples that fit the model of North and his
colleagues. The United States is a different case that still largely suits the model.
The purpose of this article is to show that the theory of North and his
colleagues over-claims. Although the theory explains relatively well the develop-
ment pattern of the West, the theory is not always able to explain the development
of contemporary non-Western countries. For this purpose, the article uses the case
of Japan to argue that the successful story of Japan shall be mainly explained by
its open access to economic organizations and activities after the Meiji Restoration
and the gradual institutional building related to the interconnected institutions.
While Japan adopted party politics to a limited extent after the Meiji Restoration
and competitive democracy with universal suffrage in 1946, Japan has been
effectively under a one-part rule most of the time since 1946. After this brief
15 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
16 Id., pp. 18–25.
17 Id., pp. 21–25.
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introduction, Part II examines the efforts to remove the restrictions in the eco-
nomic sphere to achieve open access to economic organizations and activities
after the Meiji Restoration. This part further discusses the institutional develop-
ment related to property rights protection and contract enforcement, financial
market, rule of law, and accumulation of human resources. It also argues that
Japan’s high rate of economic development is mainly the result of open access in
the economic sphere and the construction of interconnected institutions. Part III
analyses Japan’s adoption of competitive democracy after WWII. While Japan has
open access in the political sphere as it has adopted competitive democracy with
universal suffrage since WWII, its political economy conditions are conductive to
a system functionally similar to a one-party system with some minor opposition
parties. If Japan has achieved much in terms of economic and human develop-
ment, we shall not dismiss too quickly a political regime under one-party rule.18
Conclusions follow in Part IV.
2 Open access in the economic sphere
and development of the interconnected
institutions
Japan under the Tokugawa period (1603–1867) was preponderantly an agricul-
tural and feudal society although the area around Tokyo and Osaka was com-
mercially developed. Access to political and economic resources was largely
determined by family status. The emperor and the imperial court nobility were at
the top with symbolic power.19 Ranked similarly but with real power were the
shogun and daimyo. The status of a person of daimyo was determined by the
relationship with the Tokugawa family.20 Below the shogun and daimyo were
samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants who were further divided.21 While
Chinese society was also divided into different classes, mobility within classes
was permitted, with talented people assuming official positions. In contrast,
power in the Japanese society was usually related to the family status at birth.22
18 For the view that a one-party regime is unlikely to be a meaningful alternative to competitive
democracy, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 32.
19 Beasley (1972), supra note 1, p. 22.
20 Ibid.
21 Id., pp. 22–27.
22 Id., p. 39.
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Limited mobility, however, did exist during the Tokugawa period. For example,
commoners could obtain the status of samurai through education to become
professional scholars, priests, and doctors.23
To serve the interest of such a hierarchical society, education was also to
train people to function according to the hereditary status.24 The samurai was
educated in governmental han schools or in private schools called shijuku.25
Education for the samurai was to prepare them with the quality essential for
ruling society. Commoners were educated in terakoya, schools established by
temples, Shinto shrines, or private houses.26 Education for the commoners was
to train people to behave as efficient and obedient followers.27 The key differ-
ence is the component of Confucian education studies for the rulers. The
commoners serving positions of town or village officers, however, were per-
mitted to attend shijuku or even han schools for Confucian studies.28
As Japan during the Tokugawa period was a feudal society with classes,
economic restrictions or privileges were used to exploit people’s wealth. The
central government, Bakufu, frequently used the method of re-coinage to
debase the currency to gain profits.29 Local domains also issued paper
money to exploit merchants.30 Bakufu and domains also called for goyōkin
or “forced loans” to exploit wealth from merchants in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. As tax in the Tokugawa period was based on land
assessment, the forced loans collected by the feudal lords from the village
farmers and headmen were much greater than the land tax of the village.31
Still another method of controlling access to resources was the use of mono-
polies by the Bakufu and domains. The Bakufu monopolized silver, copper,
and certain herbs while domains controlled monopolized groups of mer-
chants in areas such as sugar, cotton, mulberry, shipping or marketing.32
These inflationary measures, forced loans or monopolies weakened property
rights protection, reduced incentives for long term investment, or prevented
dynamic efficiency in the economy.
23 Tetsuya Kobayashi, Tokugawa Education as a Foundation of Modern Education in Japan, 9
Comparative Education Review, no. 3 (1965), 288–302, at 289.
24 Id., p. 289.
25 Id., p. 291.
26 Id., p. 292.
27 Id., p. 289.
28 Id., p. 294.
29 Beasley (1972), supra note 1, p. 52.
30 Ibid.
31 Id., p. 53.
32 Id., pp. 53–54.
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In contrast to the privileges enjoyed by the ruling classes, the scope of freedom
of peasants was very limited. They were “not allowed to move, to change profes-
sions, to sell arable land, to partition holdings into parcels smaller than a certain
minimum, or to change their crops at will.”33 Restrictions on farmers made innova-
tion and investment on farming difficult and partly contributed to the internal crisis
during the late Tokugawa period. Moreover, foreign trade was restricted to the port
of Nagasaki and to traders from China and the Netherlands.34 When outside
pressure which resulted in the unequal treaties was coupled with the internal crisis,
the rule of the Tokugawa was replaced by the Meiji Government. Meiji reform
measures moved towards greater open access to economic organizations and
activities. First of all, the new government decided to abolish the feudal class
distinction.35 The Meiji Constitution legally confirmed equal access to civil, military
or other public offices based on legally specified qualifications or ability.36 In
addition, the Meiji government also adopted other measures including confiscating
stipends to warriors (bushi), removing restrictions on peasants, recognizing private
property rights, using land tax to replace feudal dues, disbanding guilds, liberal-
izing foreign trade, etc.37 Both domestic and foreign trade were gradually liberalized
and expanded.38 As open access to economic organizations and activities from the
Meiji Restoration was closely associated with the development of interconnected
institutions related to property rights protection and contract enforcement, financial
market, rule of law, and accumulation of human resources, the remainder of Part II
will examine these interconnected institutions.
2.1 Property rights protection and contract enforcement
To achieve the goal of “enriching the country and strengthening the army”,39
Japan was determined to adopt the western legal institutions.40 The resulting
33 Mataji Miyamoto, Yōtarō Sakudō and Yasukichi Yasuba, Economic Development in
Preindustrial Japan, 1859–1894, 25 The Journal of Economic History, no. 4 (1965), 541–564, at
542.
34 Ibid.
35 Id., p. 549.
36 The Meiji Constitution, Article 19. A soft copy of the constitution is available at: < http://afe.
easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/meiji_constitution.pdf >, accessed 15 January 2017.
37 Miyamoto et al. (1965), supra note 33, p. 549.
38 Id.
39 Beasley (1972), supra note 1, p. 2.
40 Takii Kazuhiro, translated by David Noble, The Meiji Constitution: The Japanese Experience
of the West and the Shaping of the Modern State (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2007).
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Meiji Constitution consists of many provisions on property rights protection.
The Preamble to the Meiji Constitution ensures the protection of the security
of the rights and property of the people.41 Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution
further stipulates that the property rights of Japanese people shall be invio-
late.42 Shortly after the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, Japan
adopted the Civil Code43 in 1898 and implemented the Commercial Code44 in
the same year. The Peace Preservation Law enacted in 1925 criminalized the
formation of an association with the objective of changing the system of
private property or participation in such an association with full knowledge
of the objective of the association.45 The process of adopting these codes will
be examined under the rule of law section; suffice it to say here that these
two codes have played important roles in defining and protecting property
rights. These laws limited state intervention in private affairs and better-
defined property rights of people. The changes improved the definition of
property rights on land compared with that of the Tokugawa period when
property rights on land was feudally held by the lords and private ownership
of land had not been clearly recognized.46 The land tax reform, reducing the
amount for the farmers and of promising not to increase the tax in the future,
also clarified property rights definition and increased incentives for invest-
ment.47 In addition, the land tax reform also replaced the community or
multiple forms of tax by a modern property rights system.48 The measures
of enhancing property rights protection adopted during the Meiji Restoration
were closely related to the relatively faster rate of economic development
discussed in the Introduction.
After the defeat of Japan in WWII, the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP) made efforts to democratize Japan, empowering the Japanese peo-
ple’s participation in public governance. To achieve that goal, SCAP also tried to
41 The Meiji Constitution, supra note 36.
42 Ibid.
43 Charles P. Sherman, The Debt of Modern Japanese Law to French Law, 6 California Law
Review, no. 3 (1918), 198–202.
44 Edward Jenks, Esq., The Japanese Commercial Code, 14 Journal of Comparative Legislation
and International Law, no. 1 (1932), 62–65.
45 Kenneth J. Ruoff, The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarch, 1945–1995
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 33.
46 Miyamoto et al. (1965), supra note 33, p. 544.
47 Id., p. 561.
48 Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and
Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 The University of Chicago University Law Review, no.
1 (2000), 41–98, at 51–52.
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reallocate certain power from the government to the judicial system. The 1946
Constitution49 abolished the administrative courts under the jurisdictions of
the executive government50 and delegated to the Supreme Court and the
lower courts all judicial power.51 To strengthen the power of the judiciary,
the 1946 Constitution further granted the power of judicial review of admin-
istrative and legislative actions to the Supreme Court and the lower courts.52
In terms of access to economic organizations and activities, SCAP also dis-
mantled the family-owned Zaibatsu organizations, which played important roles in
controlling economic resources and financing WWII.53 In the areas of competition
law, SCAP also demanded the enactment of antitrust law to constrain monopoliza-
tion of economic resources. With respect to land law, SCAP reinvented the regime so
that absentee landlordswere eliminated in order to install ownership to operators or
cultivators.54 In the area of corporation law, the power of shareholders was
enhanced.55 The legal profession was also given greater independence to safeguard
the rights of individuals.56 Furthermore, foreign trade and direct investment liberal-
ization took place during the 1960s and 1970s.57
Evidence of better protection of property rights can also be detected
from the judicial review of constitutionality of legislation under the
1946 Constitution. While the judiciary uses the strict scrutiny test to review
the constitutionality of legislation related to freedom of expression and
freedom of speech but uses the rational relation test to review
administrative and legislative actions related to economic activities,58 the
49 1946 Constitution, available at: < https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_
1946.pdf > , accessed 15 January 2017.
50 Percy R. Luney, Jr, “The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System”,
in Percy R. Luney, Jr and Kazuyuki Takahashi (eds.), Japanese Constitutional Law (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1993), pp. 123–149, at 126.
51 Id., p. 128.
52 1946 Constitution, supra note 49, Article 81; also see Yasuhiro Okudaira, “Forty Years of the
Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese American, and European”, in Luney and
Takashi (1993), supra note 50, p. 16.




57 Michael P. Porter and Mariko Sakakibara, Competition in Japan, 18 Journal of Economic
Perspective, no. 1 (2004), 27–50, at 32.
58 Mutsuo Nakamura, “Freedom of Economic Activities and the Right to Property” in Luney
and Takashi (1993), supra note 50, p. 256.
180 G. Yu Law and Development Review
limited cases59 where the Supreme Court declared a law unconstitutional
were dominated by economic or property rights legislation.
Several case examples will do here. In the Customs Code case of 1962, the
Supreme Court declared a law unconstitutional in that article 118 of the Code
authorizing the confiscation of the property of a third person involved in smuggling
violated the property rights of the third party in addition to due process problems.60
In the Pharmaceutical Business Act case of 1975, the Supreme Court declared
another law unconstitutional on the ground that regulating the distance of pharma-
ceutical stores to prevent the instability or competition is not reasonably related to
the causation of supplying defective drugs.61 In the Forest Act case of 1987, the
Supreme Court declared still another law unconstitutional because of the fact that
article 186 of the Forest Act prohibiting joint ownership,which is permitted by article
256 of the Civil Code, violated article 29 of the 1946 Constitution on the inviolable
right to own or hold property.62 Despite the purpose of serving the interest of public
welfare, the means used in the Forest Act was not reasonable or necessary.63 Better
property rights definition and protection have contributed considerably to Japan’s
high rate of economic development until Japan reached its steady state64 at the
beginning of the 1990s.
Closely related to property rights definition and protection is contract enfor-
cement. Contract enforcement was carried out by courts during the Tokugawa
period. Town agreements normally involved merchants or between merchants
and warriors related to commercial or financial disputes.65 Courts dealt with
these types of disputes. Claims were categorized into “money suits” and “main
suits.” Money suits were concerned with claims of principal and interest or
disputes with no use of security or collateral while main suits were concerned
with disputes involving the use of security (without interest).66 Despite the
restriction on the sale of land by peasants during the Tokugawa period,
59 There have only been five occasions where the Supreme Court of Japan declared legislative
or governmental acts unconstitutional since the adoption of judicial review in the 1946
Constitution.
60 Hiroshi Itoh, The Japanese Supreme Court: Constitutional Policies (New York: Markus Wiener
Publishing, 1989), p. 108.
61 Nakamura (2004), supra note 58, pp. 256–260.
62 Id., pp. 261–262.
63 Ibid.
64 The ceiling of growth possibilities of sustainable per capita income. For more information,
see Benigno Valdés, An Application of Convergence Theory to Japan’s Post-WWII Economic
‘Miracle’, 34 The Journal of Economic Education, no. 1 (2003), 61–81.
65 Dan Fenno Henderson, ‘Contracts’ in Tokugawa Villages, 1 Journal of Japanese Studies, no. 1
(1974), 51–90, at 60.
66 Id., p. 72.
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owner-cultivators could obtain loans by using their land as security.67 When the
borrowers failed to repay their loans, their land would be sold to others through
foreclosure of their security.68 Protection of creditors through contract enforce-
ment was also carried out when land owners could not afford to pay land tax
during the late Tokugawa period.69 The farmer land owners lost their land
largely because of the bad tax policy of not taxing other commercial or economic
activities but concentrating land tax on farmers.70
Contract enforcement based on the Western style of formal law accelerated
during the Meiji Restoration. Well before the adoption of the Civil Code and the
Commercial Code in 1898, French jurists provided Japanese judges principles of
law so that court decisions could be rested upon these principles before the
formal law was enacted.71 In difficult or complex cases when the Japanese
consulted the French jurists, the opinions of the French jurists might become
the judgments of the courts.72 As will be explained later, the Civil Code of Japan
was a product largely based on the French law and partly on the German law.73
Similarly, the Commercial Code of Japan was also partly based on French law
and partly based on German law.74 The codification of civil and commercial law
considerably facilitated the enforcement of contracts based on formal law.
Despite the adoption of the formal law, informal ways of enforcing contracts
were still widely used during the Meiji Restoration. A noticeable example is the
enforcement of rules on contracts adopted by the Tokyo Bankers Association.75
Rules adopted in 1894 required the collecting bank to report the default of a
promissory note to the Association in writing: the name, address, and amount of
the issuer.76 After receiving the report, the Association had to disclose the
content of the report to its members.77 Member banks must suspend business
transactions with the defaulting bank when notified.78 In 1900, the Tokyo
Clearing House decided to impose a fine on those which continued to conduct
67 Miyamoto et al. (1965), supra note 33, p. 546.
68 Ibid.
69 Beasley (1972), supra note 1, p. 55.
70 Ibid.
71 Sherman (1918), supra note 43, p. 199.
72 Ibid.
73 Id, p. 201.
74 Edward Jenks, Esq. (1932), supra note 44.
75 Toshihiro Matsumura and Marc Ryser, Revelation of Private Information About Unpaid Notes
in the Trade Credit Bill System in Japan, 24 The Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1 (1995), 165–187.
76 Id., p. 172.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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transactions with the issuing bank.79 A year later, the Tokyo Clearing House
further introduced rules to publish the names of the defaulting issuers in news-
papers and magazines.80 This mechanism used by the Tokyo Bankers
Association played important roles in disciplining banks issuing promissory
notes or other instruments such as bills of exchange. It not only made commer-
cial frauds difficult but also developed market means of reputation, thereby
creating the incentives and discipline of self-commitment of member banks.
Japan further refined its law on contract enforcement after WWII. Although
Japan heavily controlled the entry of legal professionals, both formal law and
informal rules worked together to facilitate contract enforcement. While some
scholars pointed out the dark side of private ordering in commercial activities,81
it is worth emphasizing that formal and informal rules have made things
difficult for informal organizations to deviate too far from the rules. Japan’s
high rate of economic development reveals that better rules may guide informal
organizations when the capacity of the formal judiciary system is limited.
Without rules, it would be far more costly to deal with disputes concerning
debt collection, landlord and tenant relations, or the resolution of other
disputes.
2.2 Financial market development
Financial market institutions play important roles in economic development. King
and Levine assess whether the value of financial depth82 in 1960 predicts the rate
of economic development, capital accumulation, and productivity growth over the
next 30 years.83 Their regression results provide a positive answer. Levine and
Zerove analyze the relation between stock market liquidity84 or the level of bank-
ing sector development and economic growth.85 Their regression results show that
stock market liquidity and banking sector development are both good predictors
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Milhaupt and West (2000), supra note 48.
82 Financial depth is defined as the liquid liability of the financial system divided by the gross
domestic product.
83 Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right, 108 Quarter
Journal of Economics, no. 3 (1993), 717–737.
84 Stock market liquidity is defined by both the value of the stock trading relative to the size of
the market and the size of the economy.
85 Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 The American
Economic Review, no. 3 (1998), 537–558.
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of economic development, capital accumulation, and productivity improve-
ments.86 If financial institutions do contribute to economic development of a
nation, evidence of the banking sector or the stock market development in
Japan is helpful.
While secured or unsecured lending already occurred during the Tokugawa
period, the formal nationwide banking sector was developed after the Meiji
Restoration. In 1882, the Government established the Bank of Japan.87 When
the head office was opened in Tokyo in that year, the Osaka Branch was also
established.88 The Bank of Japan later further established satellite offices in
other cities.89 Initially, the Japanese banking system utilized the US banking
system as its model.90 When the policy makers realized the weakness of the US
national banks, however, they decided to move away from the US model and
adapted the national banks to commercial banks with the permission of setting
up branches freely within the nation.91
Legal permission, together with government investment in transportation
and telegraph, resulted in the considerable expansion of bank branch offices
within the country. From 1884 to 1925, bank branch offices increased signifi-
cantly. For example, bank branch offices increased from 16 to 487 in Tokyo, 5 to
398 in Hyogo, and 1 to 53 in Miyazaki respectively.92 The establishment of
satellite offices of the Bank of Japan and the branch offices of the commercial
banks made it easier to obtain information of customers individually and
regions which made utilization of loans more efficiently. By the end of 1936,
the number of banks increased to 424 although six major banks accounted for
more than 53 per cent of the total outstanding deposits of the banking sector.93
Since then, the number of major banks increased to eleven at the beginning of
1990s and went down to seven again at the beginning this century.94
In addition to the construction of the banking sector, the government also
helped the banking sector in other ways. In terms of taxation, the government
before WWII favored the banking sector instead of the stock market through
86 Ibid.
87 Kris James Mitchener and Mari Ohnuki, Institutions, Competition, and Capital Market
Integration in Japan, 69 the Journal of Economic History, no. 1 (2009), 138–171, at 149.
88 Id., p. 151.
89 Id., pp. 167–68.
90 Id., p. 167.
91 Id., p. 167.
92 Id., p. 146.
93 Saburo Okita, Savings and Economic Growth in Japan, 6 Economic Development and Cultural
Change, no. 1 (1957), 32–41, at 34.
94 Hoshi and Kashyap (2004), supra note 4, p. 10.
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taxation. Income from deposit interest was taxed by a fixed rate while dividend
was taxed by a progressive rate.95 In 1937, the government further suppressed
private stock and bond issues to facilitate the issuance of government war
bonds.96 These historical events partly explained why Japan has remained a
bank-dominated financial system despite the prominence of the world ranking
of the stock market.97
At the beginning of the banking sector’s development, the government also
established the system of postal savings to absorb voluntary savings.98 In 1936,
the balance of outstanding deposits of the postal savings system was around 25
per cent of that of all the banks.99 To modernize Japan, the Meiji Government
also heavily taxed land owners in order to favor industrial activities. For
instance, the land tax accounted for 90 per cent of the revenue of the central
government at the beginning of Meiji Restoration.100 It took around forty years
for this proportion to go down to the 10 per cent level.101 During the process of
industrial development, the government introduced personal income tax in 1887
and gradually increased the rate of personal income tax from two per cent in
1895 to 7.2 per cent in 1914 and further to 18.9 per cent in 1935.102 To absorb
western technologies to accelerate industrial development, the Bank of Japan
provided loans extensively to commercial banks secured by government bonds,
stocks and other securities as collateral.103
Governmental financial institutions and commercial banking institutions
contributed a great deal to savings and therefore investment from the Meiji
Restoration to the end of 1980s. The proportion of all deposits in the banking
and postal savings system accounted for four per cent of the national income in
1893.104 Thereafter, this ratio increased to 50 per cent in 1916 and 100 per cent in
1931.105 The saving rate remained high both before and after WWII,
95 Okita (1957), supra note 93, p. 34.
96 Porter and Sakakibara (2004), supra note 57, p. 29.
97 Hoshi and Kashyapm (2004), supra note 4, p. 10.
98 Even at the beginning of this century, savings collected from the postal savings system have
been used to finance many governmental corporations in housing, construction, municipal
enterprises, and highways through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.
99 Okita (1957), supra note 93, p. 34.




104 Id., p. 34.
105 Ibid.
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increasing from 19.8 per cent during the 1930–1948 period to 34 per cent during
the 1949–1980 period.106
In addition to the significant proportion of the deposits in banks and the
postal savings system, the percentage of net issues of governmental debts in
comparison with the total net issues of primary securities is very high. From
1902 to 1946, this proportion fluctuated from 46 per cent to 63 per cent
except for the period of 1909–31.107 If the issues of primary securities of govern-
ment-established corporations are included, the above proportion would be
much higher.
While Japan has remained a bank-centered financial system, the equity
market was and is still relatively strong. Corporate equity issues accounted for
around 30 per cent of the total primary issues from 1878 to 1937 except for 51 per
cent during 1886–92 and 10 per cent during 1902–08.108 It was only after the
governmental suppression of the stock market in 1937 as discussed previously
that the proportion of corporate equity issues went down significantly to eight
per cent from 1938 to 1946 although the proportion adjusted upward to around
15 per cent during the period from 1947 to 1958.109
The ratio of net issues of primary securities to national income also
increased from around four per cent in the period of 1878–85 to 20 per cent in
the period of 1947–58.110 The average ratio for the period from 1878 to 1958 was
around 16 per cent.111 In contrast, this average ratio of net issues to national
income was about 10 per cent in the United States from 1898 to 1958.112 This
comparative figure suggests that external finance played a more significant role
in Japan than in the United States within this comparable period. Higher rate of
saving and capital formation through the banking sector and the equity market
partly explains the faster rate of economic development in Japan before 1990.113
Evidence from 1878 to 1937 also indicated that the proportion of tertiary industry
including “finance, transportation, public utilities, government, trade, and
106 Valdés (2003), supra note 64, p. 69.
107 David J. Ott, The Financial Development of Japan, 1878–1958, 69 Journal of Political
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services” consistently outperformed that of the secondary industry which cov-
ered manufacturing and construction.114 This provides collaborative evidence
that finance did matter in Japan’s fast rate of economic development.
2.3 Rule of law
While the ultimate goal of rule of law is to respect human dignity and to
enhance human equality and freedom, rule of law also provides the necessary
social and economic conditions for economic development. From the perspec-
tive of open access to economic organizations and activities, rule of law provides
the constitutional and institutional foundation of human equality, making
access to economic organizations and activities available to all rather than to
limited categories of people who possess monopolies or privileges. From the
perspective of interconnected institutions, rule of law facilitates the develop-
ment of institutions on property rights protection and contract enforcement,
protection of capital suppliers, and capital market development.115
Examination of the evolution of the legal system of Japan is therefore relevant
to explain the successful modernization of Japan after the Meiji Restoration.
Faced with the internal economic crisis and the external pressure of unequal
treaties in the later Tokugawa period, reformers raised the slogan of “enriching
the nation and strengthening the army.”116 It was after the Meiji Restoration that
the leaders made serious efforts to build a systemic legal system. On December
23, 1871, the Japanese Government sent a delegation to tour the United States,
Germany, France, and Austria.117 While the wide political objectives of the tour,
among other things, were to request the postponement of the renegotiation of
the unequal treaties and to have a direct and first hand observation of the
western civilization, the institutional goal was to search for a western-style
constitution to redefine Japan.118 The tour lasted nearly to two years until the
delegation returned to Japan in September 1873.119 During the lengthy period,
key figures of the delegation including Kido, Okubo and Itó talked to many
114 Bronfenbrenner (1961), supra note 5, p. 10.
115 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
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Finance, no. 3 (1997), 1131–1150.
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governmental leaders in the West and received many private lessons from
German, French, and Austrian jurists on the fundamental nature and principles
of a constitution.120
Bismarck advised the Japanese to use the German constitution as the
model121 because of the similarity of self-government in the two countries and
the logic that rights and laws were not meaningful without the support of
national wealth and power.122 Gneist, the most famous German historical jurist
at that time, cautioned the Japanese of the unique nature of history in a nation’s
constitution and the potential danger of popular participation through the
legislature.123 Stein, an Austrian political scientist, taught the Japanese aware-
ness of the sovereignty, will of the legislature, and action of the executive and
coordination of the different branches under the constitution.124 He further
explained the symbolic role of the sovereign power, the potential tyranny of
the majority under excessive participation, and the importance of the executive
government in adaptation to changing circumstances.125 Chlumecky, another
Austrian jurist, taught the Japanese about the practical administration of gov-
ernment during the contemplation of the creation of the legislature, the Diet.126
The knowledge gained in the tour of the West was reflected not only in the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution), but also many other
laws related to the symbolic monarchy, the election and composition of the Diet,
and the functional executive branch. These laws and ordinances included the
Imperial Household Law, the Imperial Ordinance Concerning the Power of the
Peers, the Laws of the House, the Law of Election of Members to the House of
Representatives, the Imperial University Order, the Regulations for Civil Service
Examinations and Probationary Civil Officers and the Civil Service Code, etc.127
These laws were essential for the functioning of the constitutional Meiji state.
In addition to the making of the constitution, Japan also devoted enormous
effort to building the legal system. The codification of the civil law and com-
mercial law are particularly relevant to support the open access order in the
economic sphere in general and to facilitate the construction of interconnected
institutions to provide the institutional foundation to the open access order in
the economic sphere in particular.
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At the beginning of the Meiji era, Japanese law was virtually entirely custom-
ary and full of variability and unpredictability.128 The system was not able to
support a high rate of economic development and industrialization. Similar to the
making of the constitution, Japan turned to the West for the establishment of a
modern legal system. The codification of the civil law initially was under the
French influence. This was so as the French government was already involved
during the later Tokugawa period, helping to reorganize the Japanese Army.129
French law was chosen for another reason.130 English law was mainly judge-made
law and difficult to ascertain under the information technology at that time.
Germany had not codified its civil law yet and the country was not unified.
Spain did not have a codified law. While Italy had a codified law, it was not
well known internationally. Compared with the weak nation of Italy, France not
only was stronger as a nation but also had an internationally known Civil Code,
which was easy to ascertain and understand.131
The influence of French law on Japanese law was exerted through many
different means. French jurists taught Japanese judges the principles upon
which cases could be decided before there was any codified law.132 They wrote
for Japanese judges in difficult cases opinions which became decisions of
Japanese courts.133 In addition, French jurists taught French law to Japanese
students and prospective judges in the first university law school, Tokio
University Law School, which was established in 1870, and another law school
established by the Ministry of Justice in 1872.134 As a result of the instruction of
the French law, the Civil Code of France became the basis of judgments from
1870 to 1890.135 Moreover, the French influence on Japanese law was through
the involvement of French jurists in the codification of Japanese law. As the
codification of Japanese civil law was significantly influenced by Boissonade,
one of the most famous French legal scholars in Japan at the time, the draft civil
law was called Boissonade’s Code.136 This Code, initiated in 1882 and completed
around 1892, was planned to be enacted in 1893.137 Because of the increasing
influence of Germany, those who had the expertise of German civil law started to
128 Sherman (1918), supra note 43, p. 198.
129 Ibid.
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oppose the Boissonade’s Code. To respond to the opposition, the Government
decided that implementation of the Civil Code should be postponed to 1896.138 A
commission established to review the Civil Code later decided to incorporate
part of the newly enacted German Civil Code of 1896. As a result, the Japanese
Civil Code, effective from 1898, adopted philosophical principles, structure of
organization, and part of the provisions of the German Civil Code but retained
about one-half of the provisions from the French Civil Code.139
Similar to the Civil Code, the Japanese Commercial Code had also been
based on French and German law. Different from the civil code, which was
under the influence of Boissonade, the French jurist, the drafting of the com-
mercial code was assisted by Hermann Roesler, a German jurist.140 Before the
enactment of the Commercial Code, both the French Code de Commerce of 1807
and the German Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861 had been available for reference and
utilization.141 The draft code, initially ready in 1890, was delayed for many years
because of the controversy of the Civil Code and the Commercial Code became
effective in 1898.142 Due to the changing circumstances between 1890 and 1898,
the 1898 Commercial Code was used for only a year and was replaced by the
1899 Commercial Code. The Commercial Code of 1899 was French in form and
German in substance.143
The judicial system of Japan was initially based on the French and German
system. It was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.144 The organiza-
tion of courts was based on the Court Organization Law of 1890.145 The Grand
Court of Judicature followed the name of the Cour de Cassation in France.146
Below this highest court, there were the court of appeals, the district courts,
and the ward courts.147 The judiciary system dealt with civil and criminal
cases. Administrative courts were under the executive branch of government
and could hear limited categories of appeals from government decisions when
specified by law.148
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The judicial system was strengthened after WWII. Article 76 of the 1946
Constitution abolished extraordinary tribunals such as the administrative courts
and deprived the executive branch of its final judicial power.149 The 1946
Constitution reallocated all the judicial power to the Supreme Court and the
lower courts. The enhanced level and power of the Supreme Court can also be
seen by raising the level of the Chief Justice of the Court to that of the Prime
Minister, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President of the
House of Councillors.150 Furthermore, the article strengthened the concept of
judicial independence.151 The Supreme Court is also provided with the power to
make rules for the judicial system, the procurators, and attorneys.152 Under the
new judicial system, the Supreme Court is followed by the High Courts, the
District and Family Courts, and the Summary Courts.
The Meiji Restoration developed the first constitution in Asia and con-
structed a very comprehensive rule of law system. In addition to the Civil Code
and the Commercial Code, Japan also enacted the Civil Procedural Code, the
Criminal Code, and the Criminal Procedure Code.153 These laws worked together
to provide the security and protection of individual rights related to equality,
property, mobility, etc. The legal system of the Meiji era was essential for the
open access order in the economic sphere. With respect to open access to
political organizations and activities, the Meiji Constitution did not establish a
universal suffrage system with competitive democracy. As Japan experienced a
high rate of economic development and modernization by the end of the nine-
teenth century, the Japanese legal system during the Meiji period also became
one of the learning models in China and Korea.
The already strong rule of law system established during the Meiji
Restoration had been further strengthened by the 1946 Constitution. Article 98
of the Constitution made the Constitution the supreme law of the country and
made all inconsistent laws, ordinances, imperial rescripts, or governmental acts
null and void. To help enforce the above provision, the Constitution empowered
the courts with judicial review of the constitutionality of laws and administrative
acts.154 Articles 11 and 97 reemphasized the importance of the fundamental
human rights of citizens. Other rights emphasized in the 1946 Constitution
149 1946 Constitution, supra note 49.
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included equality and no-privilege provision under Article 14, mobility under
Article 22, inviolable property rights under Article 29, etc.
After WWII, the United States became a major player through its defeat of
Japan and its occupation. The influence of US law of Japanese constitutional law
concerning judicial review and empowering the judicial system has already been
discussed. Other than the influence on constitutional law, the United States has
also dictated or influenced Japanese law in the area of corporate law, antitrust
law, land law, and labor law. While people criticized the limited capacity of the
Japanese judiciary and the dark side of the informal enforcement of the law by
criminal organizations,155 clear legal provisions under Japanese law obviously
constrained the impact or limited the extent of illegal enforcement of the law.
2.4 Education
Education plays a very important role in economic development. Romer shows
that, in a fully specified competitive equilibrium, per capita output can grow at
an increasing rate.156 Lucas’ research further supports the position that the rate
of human capital growth can be an increasing function.157 While Romer and
Lucas mainly focus on human capital in firms, human capital accumulation is
also closely related to education if we take Lucas’ point that human capital is a
social activity, involving people as groups.158 Quantitative research confirms the
role of education in economic development. Leblang’s research reveals that
there is a “positive and significant coefficient on proxy for primary educational
attainment” to economic development.159 Baum and Lack’s research indicates
the role of secondary education to economic development.160 In a globalized
world, it is education at the secondary and higher levels that positively affects
economic development.161 As education plays a very important role in economic
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development, examining the evolution and development of education at differ-
ent levels will explain a significant part of the economic development story of
Japan after the Meiji Restoration.
Under the Confucian influence, Japan emphasized the importance of educa-
tion long before the Meiji Restoration. Despite the fact of linking education to the
status of people largely determined by birth, education was already very devel-
oped during the Tokugawa period. While it is difficult to assess the level of
education of the samurai due to the lack of adequate statistical materials, it is
generally concluded that they were highly literate.162 With respect to the com-
moners, about 40 to 50 per cent of the male and 15 per cent of the female were
literate.163
Most of the territory under the control of the central government, Bakufu, was
divided into around three hundred hans or domains, with each han having at
least one han school.164 Samurais were educated either at han schools established
by local governments or at shijuku, privately established schools.165 As for the
commoners, they sent their children for education at Terakoya, schools initially
established by temples and later also by Shinto shrines and private houses.166 To
a limited extent, however, some upper commoners attended han schools or
shijuku as examined previously.167
In addition to the general schools, a school of Rangaku (Dutch studies) was
developed in the early seventeenth century.168 Two hundred years later, Dutch
scholars were found all over Japan, involved in the teaching of military technol-
ogy, medical science, mathematics, political history, etc.169 Emphasis on educa-
tion was also reflected in the schools established to study French and Western
law. During the later Tokugawa period, the Bakufu School of Occidental Studies
already offered subjects including astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, physics,
geography, philosophy, mechanics, foreign languages, etc.
Built upon the educational system from the Tokugawa period, the Meiji
government abolished the han system and han schools to further improve the
educational system in 1871.170 Unlike the Tokugawa government when there was
no centralized office on education, the Meiji government established the
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Ministry of Education to govern education.171 The next year, the government
quickly adopted a comprehensive education reform plan, the Gakusei
(Fundamental Code of Education).172 Influenced by the French school system,
the plan divided the country into eight academic districts, 32 secondary school
districts, and 210 elementary school districts.173 Each academic district would
contain a university, each secondary school district would have a secondary school
and each elementary school district would provide an elementary school.174
Furthermore, normal schools would also be established to train teachers.175
The efforts of the Meiji government in abolishing the distinction of educa-
tion based on social status or class and in emphasizing elementary school
education led to significant progress. Ten years after the operation of the
Fundamental Code of Education, Japan had already established 29,081 elemen-
tary schools, built 194 secondary schools and 71 higher schools, and developed
one university.176 In 1885, Japan established three-year vocational schools in
areas of technology, commerce, and agriculture.177 The quality of students in
these vocational schools was very high.178 The school attendance rate also
increased considerably. More than 98 per cent of the children attended elemen-
tary school by 1910.179 Despite this very high school attendance rate at that time,
further improvement has been made since 1925 when the enrolment rate of
children in elementary school exceeded 99 per cent.180
Although Meiji education already introduced the policy of universal educa-
tion,181 Japan continued to improve the compulsory education system after
WWII. While compulsory education only covered four years of ordinary primary
schools in 1886 under the Primary School Order,182 this was extended to six
years for primary school education in 1907.183 In 1947, Japan promulgated the
Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law to extend the
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compulsory education from six years of elementary school to nine years to cover
another three years of lower secondary school.184 Compared with most other
Asian countries, the proportion of students enrolled in secondary schools in
Japan was already very high in 1915 when the enrolment rate reached 19.9 per
cent.185 Nevertheless, the enrolment rate of secondary schools increased to 39.7 per
cent in 1935.186 The extension of compulsory education in 1947 further contributed
to the enrolment rate of students to higher schools. This enrolment rate to higher
secondary schools increased from 47.4 per cent in 1955 to 79.4 per cent in 1970 and
further to 91.9 per cent in 1975.187 At the beginning of the 1980s when the Japanese
economy was strong, around 95 per cent of the graduates of lower secondary
schools entered high secondary schools.188
A brief comparison between the average schooling of the total population in
Japan and the United State is helpful. While the average schooling in Japan was
around 20 per cent of that in the United States in 1890, that level in Japan was
increased to 85 per cent of that in the United States in 1990.189 The evidence
shows that the annual growth rate of the average schooling of the total popula-
tion in Japan reached 2.2 per cent during the period of 1890–1990 whereas the
same annual growth rate in the United States in the this period was only 0.7 per
cent, revealing a 200 per cent higher growth of the average schooling of the
population in the period.190
A breakdown comparison of the relative change of speed on average schooling,
capital-labor ratio, and per capita GDP growth during 1890–1910 and 1910–1970 is
even more revealing on the role of education in Japan’s economic development.
Hayami has provided the evidence. During the first period, “the growth rate of
average schooling in Japan was five times higher than in the United States.”191
Similarly, the growth rate of capital-labor ratio was around 50 per cent higher in
Japan than in the United States.192 Compared with the much higher speed of average
growth rate of schooling and the high but less significant speed of capital-labor ratio
change, the per capita GDP growth rate was 40 per cent slower in Japan than that in
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the United States.193 During the second period, however, things are different. The
growth rate of both the per capita GDP and the capital-labor ratio was four times
faster in Japan than in the United States,194 but the growth rate of the average
schooling in Japan was only two times faster.195 The comparison means that accu-
mulation of human capital and physical capital firstly has to catch-up before the per
capita GDP if a later comer wants to surpass an early leader. One shortcoming of
Hayami’s research is the lack of attention to higher education in Japan.
Higher education has also experienced significant development since the
Meiji Restoration. The University of Tokyo, the first university in the history of
Japan was established in 1877.196 Faster rate of development of the higher
education sector mainly occurred, however, after WWII. In 1915, only one per
cent of the age group of students entered university to receive higher educa-
tion.197 This rate was increased slowly to three per cent in 1935 despite an
interval of 20 years.198 In 1955, however, 17.2 per cent of the students from
higher secondary schools went to universities.199 The most significant change
happened during the next 20 years when 38.4 per cent of the higher secondary
school students became enrolled in universities in 1975.200 Compared with the
20 years from 1915 to 1935 when the rate of increase was only two per cent, the
20 years from 1955 to 1975 witnessed the significant change of the enrolment rate
of higher secondary school students into universities by 21.2 per cent. It is also
worth pointing out that Japan also experienced the fastest rate of economic
growth during the 20 years from 1955 to 1975. It appears that it is the relative rate
of change rather than the absolute level of higher education that is closely
associated with the higher rate of economic development during this period.
3 Open access in the political sphere
and its effect on economic development
Japan started to have the first election of the members of the Imperial Parliament,
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Members of the House of Representatives in 1889.202 Due to restrictions on gender
and tax, however, only one per cent of the population had the right to vote at that
time.203 With the gradual reduction of tax payment requirement, the eligible voters
slowly increased to two per cent in 1902 despite a decade’s practice.204 The increase
of the voting population remained low when five per cent of the people became
eligible in 1920.205 In 1928, the suffragewas extended to all male reaching the age of
25, resulting in the expansion of the voting population to 20 per cent.206 Universal
franchise to both male and female was adopted under the US occupation in 1946
when Japan passed the second Constitution.207
The history of political parties in Japan is relative short. Parties started to
develop mainly after the Meiji Constitution. The first time when a political
party leader became Prime Minister was 1918.208 Since then, the Prime
Minister has normally come from the majority party in the Diet.209 Unlike
other countries, Japan is more likely to be dominated by a major political
party with the opposition of some smaller parties. From 1910–1940, Rikken
Seiyūkai was the dominant political force and the “permanent alliance
between parts of the Meiji oligarchy, the bureaucracy and members of the
liberal party.”210 After WWII, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has become
the dominant party since 1955 except for two short periods. The first of these
periods of 10 months was in June 1993 when a large number of young
members of the LDP quit the party.211 This event resulted in a loss of no
confidence vote of the LDP-led government in the House of
Representatives.212 As the LDP failed to obtain a majority in the following
general election, the coalition government was established by eight parties
without the LDP.213 The second period when the LDP was not in power was
during 2009–2012 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ruled Japan.214
202 Kazuhiro (2007), supra note 40, p. 96.
203 Kuroda (2005), supra note 10, pp. 147–148.
204 Id., pp. 152–153.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Id., p. 153.
208 Ruoff (2001), supra note 45, p. 30.
209 Ibid.
210 For more information, see List of Political Parties, available at: < https://www.britannica.
com/topic/list-of-political-parties-2028711 > , accessed 20 March 2017.
211 Roger W. Bowen, Japan’s Dysfunctional Democracy (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe,
2003), p. 37.
212 Id., p. 45.
213 Ibid.
214 “List of Political Parties”, supra note 210.
Open Access in the Economic Sphere or the Political Sphere 197
The party system before 1994 is very different from the one thereafter.
Likewise is the election system of the House of Representatives (HR) whose
members serve a term of four years.215 During the period of 1955–1993, the
Japanese political party system was described as a one-and-a-half party sys-
tem.216 The dominant party was the LDP. During its peak in 1958, the LDP
received 45 per cent of the support of the electorate.217 Because the Japanese
Socialist Party (JSP) was never able to obtain a majority in the elections, it was
considered as a permanent opposition. Even at its most successful time, the JSP
obtained the support of around 25 per cent of the electorate.218 Established in
1925, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) reached its peak in the 1970s. Even
during that period, however, the JCP never won more than 11 per cent of the
vote.219 Other minor parties during the period of 1955–1993 included the
Democratic Socialist Party, the New Liberal Club, and the Japan New Party.220
These parties were even not always able to keep alive.
The election system of the HR before 1994 was described as single non-
transferable vote in multimember districts (SNTV/MMD).221 Under such a system,
each district had on average three to five seats.222 Each voter chose his or her
favored candidate. Votes could not be transferred to the party if the running
candidate failed to receive the necessary winning votes.223 Since there were 519
seats in the HR, each competing party had to put forward more than one candi-
date in order to succeed in the 129 electoral districts to gain a majority.224 The LDP
normally placed more than two candidates in each district. Given that success of
the election was to a large extent based on the ability of the candidates or faction
leaders within the party, party factions played important roles in politics.
Unhappy with the political system dominated by one political party, Japan
reformed its election system for the HR. Under the 1994 system, each voter has
two votes.225 One is for the candidate of his or her choice in the single-member
district. The other is for the political party of his or her choice in one of the
eleven regional districts according to the proportional representation (PR) ballot.
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Three hundred seats are allocated to the single-member districts and 180 seats to
the PR regional districts.226 Under this unlinked system, the winning seats of a
party from the single-member districts and the winning seats from the PR
regional districts are separated.227 The 1994 electoral system, however, permits
those candidates who are running in the single-member districts to place their
names under the closed party-list in the PR districts. This provides an opportu-
nity for those who lose in the single-member districts to survive in the PR
districts.228 While the purpose of the reform was to achieve a potential two
major-party political system through the use or expansion of single-member
districts, path dependence of considering the interest of smaller parties resulted
in the partial use of the proportional representation model. As a result, the
reformed system created a dominant party with many smaller opposition parties.
The LDP has kept its domination with or without the coalition of the Komeito,
but the opposition has changed a lot. The former left Japanese Socialist Party
(JSP) has been considerably marginalized under the new system. There are other
small opposition parties, but they come and go. As a result, the only change
from the electoral reform is the major opposition party.229
The election system for the House of Councillors (HC) is amixed system. The HC
consisted of 252 members who serve for a term of six years.230 Half of the members
are replaced through elections every three years. To address the fairness issue of
voter disparity in urban and rural areas, the total number of seats was adjusted a
few times and has been reduced to the current level of 242. Among the 242 seats, 146
are elected from 47 multi-member metropolitan or prefectural districts and the
remaining 96 are elected from one at-large national constituency based on PR
open party-lists.231 Unlike the HR, the House of Councillors is not subject to
dissolution to maintain stability.232 Under the bicameral system, the House of
Representative is the more powerful division within the Diet as it chooses the
Prime Minister and initiates most of the legislation.233
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Why multi-party elections in Japan after 1955 have persistently kept the LDP
dominant in Japanese politics remains a puzzle. Good leadership during recov-
ery from WWII might be a possible explanation as the rate of economic growth
was enormously high from 1950 to 1990. This explanation, however, is not able
to explain the economy after 1990 when the economic growth rate had been very
low and unemployment increased. Opinion surveys from 1996 to 1998 repeatedly
indicated that citizens did not trust politics or politicians.234 The survey results
obtained by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in 1996 revealed that 76 per cent of
respondents said that they did not trust politics.235 In a 1998 survey on whether
certain political organizations or politicians are trustworthy, only two per cent of
the respondents replied that the Prime Minister was trustworthy and only three
per cent of the respondents indicated that the Diet was trustworthy.236 Better
explanations are needed.
Scheiner has, so far, offered the best explanation of the reason the LDP has
been able to dominate the Japanese political landscape. According to Scheiner,
there are three major reasons.237 Firstly, the clientelist structure in Japan weak-
ens opposition parties.238 In such a system, party-controlled governments
reward supporters in elections with patronage. Vote-rich electoral districts pro-
vide votes to the party which offers public sector projects through the govern-
ment it controls to firms which supply jobs to the voters in these districts. The
resource-rich firms give party politicians money or other benefits in exchange for
public sector projects.239 For instance, the Japanese Government devoted pro-
portionally far more resources (8.7% of GDP) to construction firms in 1996 than
governments in the West, e. g., the French Government (3.2%), the German
Government (2.2%), the US government (1.7%), and the UK government
(1.4%).240 Japanese construction firms are not only the biggest supporters of
the LDP with donations but also the strongest mobilizing forces favoring the LDP
in elections.241 Construction firms employ close to 10 per cent of the workforce,
most of the employment are in LDP controlled election districts or rural areas.242
In addition to jobs provided by construction firms in rural areas, the
Japanese government devotes much higher spending to the agricultural sector
234 Bowen (2003), supra note 211, p. 114.
235 Ibid.
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238 Ibid.
239 Id., p. 14.
240 Id., p. 70.
241 Id., p. 72.
242 Ibid.
200 G. Yu Law and Development Review
(8–12% of the national budget) in the form of subsidies as compared with
France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom (between 2–
4%).243 In turn, most farmers are the loyal supporters of the LDP. One survey
shows that roughly 71 per cent of the farmers who supported any political party
voted for the LDP.244 Other evidence revealed that the LDP was able to utilize
around 50 per cent of the total rural votes to obtain more than 75 per cent of the
seats in single-member rural districts.245
Secondly, funding of public projects centralized by the national government
with a clientelist structure further weakens opposition parties.246 Local politi-
cians with the control of the governments have to align with the national
government in order to gain more resources for their local districts. According
to Scheiner, weak national parties are less likely to successfully extend the party
network to local areas.247
Thirdly, institutionalized protection of political supporters’ benefits offered
by the dominant party exacerbates the difficulty of opposition parties.248 As has
been examined, the Japanese Government heavily subsidizes the construction
firms and farmers. With the support of these groups which receive systematic
political benefits, the LDP is in a more advantageous position in comparison
with the opposition parties in elections. Institutionalized protection and cliente-
lism, however, do not always explain well the performance of the dominant
party. For instance, the elders in Japan receive very good treatment as the
Japanese Government devoted around 50 per cent of the welfare expenditures
to the pension for the retired.249 Despite the fact that the elderly are more likely
to vote,250 they did not always vote for the LDP.251 People may say that the group
of retired persons is not a good example to argue against Scheiner’s clientelism
and institutionalized protection of supporters as the policy for the retired was
established well before the creation of the LDP.252 The difficulty with this
243 Ikuo Kabashima, Supportive Participation with Economic Growth: The Case of Japan, 36
World Politics, no. 3 (1984), 309–338, at 327–329.
244 Id., 332.
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249 Gregory J. Kasza and Takashi Horie, “Welfare Policy”, in Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra
Jain (eds.), Japanese Politics Today: From Karaoky to Kabuki Democracy (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011), p. 144.
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251 See Half of New Teen Voters Choose Ruling Parties, available at: < http://www.asahi.com/
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argument is the reason the LDP has not tried to carry out reform of the retire-
ment pension system when the economy started to slow down from the 1990s
and when Japan is facing increasing competition from South Korea and China.
Although Scheiner explains relatively well the reason the LDP has domi-
nated the political system, the author does not have much to say about the
cooperation between the LDP and its opposition, including the JSP before 1994
and other opposition parties thereafter. If competitive democracy matters sig-
nificantly in the Japanese society, the LDP does not have to cooperate with the
opposition in the making of laws and public policies, at least most of the time.
The reality shows, however, that the LDP has been actively cooperating with its
opposition despite its majority position either under the 1955 election system or
under the 1994 system.253
Kuroda developed the bilayer theory to explain the surface and latent
aspects of Japanese politics.254 According to Kuroda, the bilayer theory has
become the Japanese method of coping with the changing nature of the political
system in Japan at least from the seventh century.255 There has been some
evidence supporting this theory. For instance, the Japanese have placed signifi-
cant emphasis on dynastic legitimacy and continuity of the throne within one
family. The monarchy’s major function, however, has been symbolic during
most of the time in history.256 Direct rule by the imperial family appeared to
be short-lived and exceptional during the lengthy history of 1600 years.257
During the more recent Tokugawa period before the Meiji Restoration, the
Emperor played the symbolic role of the nation’s ruler while the Shogun acted
as de facto ruler.258 The Meiji Restoration established the system of constitu-
tional monarchy. Despite what was stipulated in the Meiji Constitution that “the
Emperor of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors
unbroken for ages external”259 and “the Emperor is the head of the Empire,
combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty and exercises them, according to
the provisions of the present Constitution”,260 the real power, however, was
rested with the genrōs or elder statesmen who “played a decisive role in mana-
ging the government.”261
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The bilayer theory is also able to explain the reason the Interparty Relations
Committee (IPRC), which is not a formal organization of the Diet, plays impor-
tant roles in Japan. Under the 1946 Constitution, the Emperor becomes the
symbol of the state, playing some ceremonial roles.262 The real power shall be
with the Diet as the “Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be
the sole law-making organ of the State”.263 In reality, the IPRC plays decisive
roles in the choice of the Prime Minister and the making of law. Kuroda vividly
describes in the following paragraph264:
External forces created the Diet, including the HMC and plenary sessions where Diet
members act in accordance with Western standards in appearance, debating pros and
cons of issues, and deciding them by majority rule with due respect paid to opposition
parties. This is called tatemae-level performance or ritual. The substance, however, was to
be processed by the IPRC, where members of the Diet can informally negotiate (through
hon’ne-level communication) and arrive at a consensus behind closed doors in advance of
formal proceedings. The IPRC involves itself at all levels of the legislative process from a
section in bureaucracy to the ruling party’s Policy Affairs Research Council, the cabinet,
and all through the plenary session.
Under the 1955 system, the IPRC of the LDP worked closely with those of the
opposition, especially the JSP.265 Despite efforts to eliminate IPRC politics, IPRC
norms continue and are well alive.266 Under the 1994 electoral system, the IPRCs
of the ruling coalition have to reach consensus before they are able to negotiate
with the IPRCs of the opposition parties informally and behind closed doors.267
As the Japanese elites reject the majority rule in favor of consensus building,
the effect of the competitive democracy in terms of multiparty election achieves
something very similar to that under a one-party-rule system in China. Kuroda is
in favor of such practice as the latent part reflects the representation of a greater
segment of the people in society than what can be achieved by the strict
observation of the majority rule.268 He also pointed out other benefits such as
the elimination of poverty, the achievement of equality, and the maintenance of
political stability for sustainable economic development269 despite criticisms of
dysfunctional democracy in Japan.270
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If election is one thing and politics under the surface is quite a different
thing, the case of Japan can hardly be used to support the open access theory or
requirements advocated by North and his colleagues. A country is an open
access order, according to North et al., only when there is open access in the
political sphere and open access in the economic sphere. While Japan meets
both criteria, it is the open access in the economic sphere and the intercon-
nected institutions examined in the previous sections that drive Japan’s eco-
nomic and human development since the Meiji Restoration. This implies that
economic or human development does not have to occur in an open access
order.
A major difficulty of using the case of Japan to argue against the open
access theory is the coincidence of the very high rate of economic development
and the adoption of competitive democracy with universal suffrage after 1946.
Correlation, however, does not mean causation: that it is the adoption of
competitive democracy which results in the extraordinary economic and
human development after WWII. First of all, statistical regression is not able
to establish the correlation between popular competitive democracy and eco-
nomic development in the contemporary world.271 Secondly, the bilayer theory
suggests that it is not popular election under competitive democracy that works
but the cooperation of elites under the surface that achieves policy objectives in
Japan. Thirdly, it is the interconnected institutions related to contract enforce-
ment and property rights protection, financial market, rule of law, and accumu-
lation of human resources that have contributed significantly to the economic
and human development since the Meiji Restoration. Evidence in this article
shows that most of the institutional building had been completed before WWII.
The remaining improvement of the interconnected institutions after WWII was
already inevitable.
While it is true that the fastest rates of economic development in Japan
occurred during the period of 1946–1975, it is the significant improvement of the
institutions of higher learning that matters much more. Japan had already
achieved considerable results in terms of universal education for the primary
schools after the Meiji Restoration. At the beginning of this century, Japan
surpassed virtually all the other Asian countries in terms of the enrolment rate
of children in primary schools. Secondary education had also achieved great
progress well before WWII although compulsory universal education was
extended to junior secondary schools after 1946. The higher education sector,
however, was the only remaining area that needed the most significant
271 For a literature review, see Guanghua Yu, The Roles of Law and Politics in China’s Economic
Development (Singapore: Springer, 2014), chapter 7.
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development to place Japan well ahead of most other countries after WWII. In
the section on the accumulation of human resources, it has already been shown
that the enrolment rate into universities was improved by two per cent only from
1915–1935 but by 21.2 per cent from 1955 to 1975. This was exactly the period that
Japan experienced the most significant economic growth.
Furthermore, well before Japan started to have party politics, it had already
become very strong both in terms of military power and in terms of economic
strength. The economic development after the Meiji Restoration could only be
attributed to Japan’s adoption of the open access in the economic sphere and
institutional building amongst the interconnected institutions. These intercon-
nected institutions include policy and rule changes related to contract enforce-
ment and property rights protection, development of the market and finance,
establishment of the rule of law system, and emphasis on the development of
institutions of accumulation of human resources. The development of these
interconnected institutions occurred long before party politics in Japan. The
examination of this section so far indicates that the case of Japan also suggests
that it is the open access in the economic sphere and the interconnected
institutions that are responsible for Japan’s fast rate of economic and human
development. When the economy is good under open access in the economic
sphere and the interconnected institutions have also been well developed,
competitive democracy can be adopted whether it is chosen voluntarily by the
domestic government of a country or by imposition of external forces. Although
Japan would have decided to adopt competitive democracy with universal
suffrage after WWII had things happened differently, this does not mean that
Japan would not have achieved significant economic development in the
absence of the current multiparty-party political system.
The discussion in this part does not try to claim that the Japanese system is
not democratic after WWII, it shows instead that the high rate of economic
development is more closely related to open access in the economic sphere. In
addition, this part tries to suggest that Japan has been effectively under one-
party rule since 1955 despite the adoption of competition democracy.
4 Conclusion
The article uses the case of Japan to argue that the theory of open access order
which is advocated by North and his colleagues goes beyond what is necessary.
Although their theory of open access order explains the West relatively well, it
does not always apply to contemporary non-Western countries. Similar to the
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case of India examined elsewhere,272 the case of Japan reveals that what is more
important to economic and human development is the open access in the
economic sphere and the interconnected institutions in the areas of property
rights protection and contract enforcement, financial market, rule of law, and
human resource accumulation. In other words, countries without open access in
the political sphere may also be able to achieve great success in terms of
economic and human development if they ensure open access in the economic
sphere and devote adequate resources to establishing the necessary intercon-
nected institutions examined in this article. If contemporary non-western coun-
tries are able to move in this direction, relatively good economic and human
development will occur. While elite democracy under limited open access in the
political sphere used to play important roles in improving human freedom,
equality, and dignity in the West, these valuable concepts can now be borrowed
to differing degrees by most of the contemporary non-western countries with or
without adopting competitive democracy. Further research elsewhere on
Singapore and China will shed more light on this debate.
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